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American Banker's 
Ass'n v. SEC: SEC 
Has No Authority to 
Regulate Banks Dealing 
with the Purchase and 
Sale of Securities 
R ecently, inAmen·can Banker'sAss'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986}, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia cir-
cuit held that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has no authority to 
regulate the transactions that banks make 
in dealing with the purchase and sale of 
securities and invalidated a rule issued by 
the SEC that had attempted to regulate 
such banks in the same manner as it does 
securities brokers or dealers. In so holding 
the court reinforced the clear intent of 
Congress that the regulation of banks was 
not among the powers delegated to the SEC 
in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
( 1934 Act). 15 U .S.C. § 78a. 
In 1985, the SEC adopted Rule 3b-9 fol-
lowing a notice and comment rulemaking 
procedure. That rule required banks which 
engaged in the securities brokerage busi-
ness for profit to register with the SEC as 
broker-dealers pursuant to the 1934 Act. 
The American Bankers Association (ABA) 
filed suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia seeking a dec-
laratory judgment that Rule 3b-9 was in-
valid under the 1934 Act, and an injunction 
prohibiting the SEC from enforcing the 
rule against ABA banks. On cross-motions 
for summary judgment, the court ruled for 
the SEC and dismissed the case. An appeal 
to the court of appeals was taken by the 
ABA. 
The controversy in the present case is 
the result of fifty years of evolving banking 
and securities regulations. In order to un-
derstand the present conflict, a brief his-
tory of the earlier legislation concerning 
34-The Law Forum/Spring, 1987 
by Cynthia A. Houghten 
the subject is helpful. Section 16 of the 
Banking Act of 1933, also known as the 
Glass-Steagall Act, limited securities deal-
ings by banks to purchasing and selling 
stocks without recourse for existing cus-
tomers and subjected the purchase of stocks 
for the bank's own account to certain re-
strictions mandated by the Comptroller of 
the Currency. In pertinent part§ 16 states: 
The business of dealing in securities 
and stock by the [national bank] shall 
be limited to purchasing and selling 
such securities and stock without re-
course, solely upon the order, and for 
the account of customers, and in no 
case for its own account, and the [na-
tional bank] shall not underwrite any 
issue of securities or stock: Provided: 
That the [national bank] may purchase 
for its own account investment securi-
ties under such limitations and restric-
tion as the Comptroller of the Currency 
may be regulation prescribe. 
12 u.s.c. § 24. 
Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act estab-
lished a clear line between investment and 
commercial banking activities, and pro-
hibited the coexistence of the two in any 
one organization. That section provides: 
[I]t shall be unlawful ... for any per-
son, firm, corporation, association, 
business trust, or similar organization, 
engaged in the business of issuing, un-
derwriting, selling, or distributing, at 
wholesale or retail, or though syndicate 
participation, stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, notes, or other securities, to 
engage at the same time to any extent 
whatever in the business of receiving 
deposits subject to check or to repay-
ment upon presentation of a passbook, 
certificate of deposit, or other evidence 
of debt, or upon request of the deposi-
tor: Provided, that the provisions of 
this paragraph shall not prohibit na-
tional banks or State banks or trust 
companies (whether or not members 
of the Federal Reserve System) or other 
financial institutions or private bank-
ers from dealing in, underwriting, 
purchasing and selling investment 
securities, or issuing securities, to the 
extent permitted to national banking 
associations by the provisions of sec-
tion 24 of this title .... 
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1). 
The Comptroller of the Currency inter-
preted the Glass-Steagall Act in 1936 as 
limiting the activities of national banks to 
brokerage transactions for existing cus-
tomers of the bank. Banks so dealing were 
prohibited from retaining any commissions 
from stock transactions unless the fee did 
not exceed the cost of the transaction. 
Therefore, under the Glass-Steagall Act, a 
bank could engage in the securities busi-
ness only as "an accommodation agent for 
the convenience of its existing customers 
and not for profit." 1 Bulletin of the Comp-
troller of the Currency paragraph 35 (Oc-
tober 26, 1936). 
Since its enactment in 1933, the Comp-
troller's interpretation of the Glass-Steagall 
Act has changed several times, each time 
becoming progressively more liberal. The 
first change came in 1957, when an opinion 
of the Comptroller of the Currencyreversed 
the prohibition against national banks re-
ceiving profits from brokerage transactions 
performed for the convenience of their 
customers. See Digest of Opinions of the 
Comptroller of the Currency paragraph 
220A (August 1957 Edition) (quoted in 
[1973-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) paragraph 96,272 at 
81,357). Nevertheless, a bank's brokerage 
activities were still limited to an accom-
modation service for their existing cus-
tomers whose relationship with the bank 
existed "independently of the particular 
securities transaction." !d. The next change 
came in 1974 when the Comptroller al-
lowed banks to "offer and advertise 
computer-assisted stock purchasing ser-
vices." American Banker's Ass'n, 804 F.2d 
at 741. This service was still limited to 
customers with checking accounts at the 
particular bank. Finally, the interpreta-
tion of the Act came full swing when the 
Comptroller of the Currency permitted 
national banks to establish subsidiaries to 
offer retail discount brokerage services, 
even to non-customers, at branch offices of 
the banks. See In re Security Pacific Nat'/ 
Bank (August 26, 1982) (reprinted in 
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) paragraph 99,824 at 
86,255). The ruling in In re Security Pacific 
Nat'/ Bank was subsequently extended to 
allow the bank, itself, to offer brokerage 
services in addition to those of a subsidiary. 
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Currency 
Opinion Letter No. 363 (May 23, 1986); 
see also 50 Fed. Reg. 31,605 (August 5, 
1985) (withdrawing proposed rule requir-
ing the use of a subsidiary to engage in dis-
count brokerage services). In support, the 
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, which 
have the power to interpret the Glass-
Steagall Act, have concurred with this 
most recent decision of the Comptroller of 
the Currency. 
Prior to the 1980's, the SEC did not 
attempt to regulate the activities of banks 
dealing in securities. In recent years, 
however, numerous banks entered into the 
discount brokerage service as a result of 
the changed interpretation of the Glass-
Steagall Act. This prompted the SEC to 
promulgate Rule 3b-9 to subject banks to 
the same regulations as non-bank brokers. 
The new rule regulated a bank that either 
"publicly solicits brokerage business for 
which it receives transaction-related com-
pensation" or "receives transaction-related 
compensation for providing brokerage ser-
vices for trust, managing agency or other 
accounts to which the bank provides ad-
vice." 17 C.F.R. § 240-3b-9(a)(l)-(2) 
(1986). A "transaction-related compensa-
tion" is defined in the rule as the "mean 
monetary profit to the bank in excess of 
cost recovery for providing brokerage exe-
cution services." 17 C.F.R. § 240-3b-9(d). 
Thus the rule seeks to regulate all banks 
which make a profit on securities transac-
tions. The SEC subjected banks dealing in 
securities to the new rule under the theory 
that government regulation should be di-
vided among the various agencies "accord-
ing to the different financial functions per-
formed by the regulated entity, and not 
according to the species of [the] financial 
institution." American Banker's Ass'n, 804 
F.2d at 742. 
However, according to the court, the 
SEC's theory contradicted the express in-
tent of Congress. In order to promulgate 
the rule, the ~EC coined definitions ofkey 
"It was the clear 
intent of Congress 
that the regulation 
of banks was not 
among the powers 
delegated to the SEC 
in the Securities 
and Exchange Act 
of 1934." 
terms that conflicted with the definitions 
for the same words in the 1934 Act. The 
1934 Act defines the word "broker" to 
mean "any person engaging in the business 
of effecting transactions in securities for 
the account of others, but does not include a 
bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). Similarly, 
the term "dealer" is defined in the Act as 
"any person engaged in the business of 
buying or selling securities for his own 
account ... but does not include a bank." 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
Each definition clearly exempted a bank 
from the meaning of the words ''broker" or 
"dealer." The definition of a "bank" under 
the Act was tied to the entities that regulate 
the banking industry. A bank was "essen-
tially ... an institution subject to at least 
one of several existing banking regulators: 
the federal Comptroller of the Currency 
(for all nationally chartered banks), the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (for a member bank), or any other 
state or Federal authority having supervi-
sion over banks." 804 F.2d at 744. How-
ever, in Rule 3b-9, the SEC reinserts into 
the definitions of broker and dealer any 
bank that: "(1) Publicly solicits brokerage 
business for which it receives transaction-
related compensation ... ;"or "(2) Directly 
or indirectly receives transaction-related 
compensation for providing brokerage ser-
vices for trust, managing agency, or other 
accounts to which the bank provides ad-
vice." 17 C.F.R. § 240-3b-9(a)(1}{2) 1986). 
By so doing, the SEC attempted to regu-
late an area over which it previously had 
no jurisdiction. 
In striking down the rule, the court re-
lied on and provided a detailed account of 
the legislative history behind the 1934 Act. 
The purpose of the 1934 Act was to sub-
ject the previously unregulated securities 
market to government control similar to 
that already imposed on banks by the Glass-
Steagall Act. While Congress created a 
new agency, the SEC, to supervise invest-
ment banking, it clearly excluded banks 
from further regulation. See H. Rep. No 
1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 17. Exclusion 
of the banks from the SEC's jurisdiction 
also protected against over-regulation of 
banks by "two arms of the Government 
whose purposes and policies might at times 
conflict." Stock Exchange Practices: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking 
and Currency, Part 15, 73rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. 7222 (1934). In later legislation con-
cerning investment banking, Congress 
was consistent in its definition of banks ac-
cording to the agencies which regulated 
them and excluded commercial banks 
from regulation by the SEC. See Invest-
ment Company and Investment Advisers 
Acts, 54 Stat. 791 ( 1940). 
The SEC argued that Congress exempted 
banks from regulation in the 1934 Act 
since Congress believed that the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited banks 
from brokering securities for non-banking 
customers or for profit. The SEC relied on 
the testimony before Congress of Mr. 
Thomas Corcoran, one of the drafters of 
the Act, and then counsel to the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, to prove 
that such was Congress' interpretation of 
the 1934 Act. Corcoran testified that 
under the Glass-Steagall bill a bank 
can no longer peddle securities at re-
tail. It can do two things: it can buy 
securities for its own account, for its 
own investment; and it can act as agent 
to transmit to a broker an order to pur-
chase or sell securities, given to it by 
one of the bank's customers. 
See Senate Hearings, supra at 6470. 
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Thus, the SEC contended that under the 
Glass-Steagall Act, banks were either pre-
cluded from engaging in specified broker-
age activities or that if the Glass-Steagall 
Act did not so prohibit, that the SEC 
should be able to regulate the new retail 
brokerage activities of banks. 
The court disagreed with that argument 
and assumed that the testimony of Cor-
coran was an incorrect interpretation of 
the Glass-Steagall Act. Further, the court 
noted that Congress expressly intended to 
exempt banks from the regulation by the 
SEC of broker-dealers since banks were 
already heavily regulated by other state 
and federal agencies. Finally, the court 
refused to believe that in enacting the 1934 
Act, Congress had done so based on their 
misinterpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
and would not have exempted banks from 
the SEC's jurisdiction had it known how 
the Glass-Steagall Act would later be inter-
preted. 
The court lent further weight to the idea 
that Congress intended to exclude banks 
from the SEC's regulatory power by point-
ing out that more recent legislation reaf-
firmed the separation of regulatory powers 
over investment and commercial banks. In 
1975, while aware of the changed interpre-
tation of the Glass-Steagall Act, which by 
then had dropped the accommodation 
concept, Congress declined to redefine the 
terms broker or dealer to include banks. It 
did, however, authorize the SEC to con-
duct a study into the emergence of banks 
into the retail brokerage industry. Act of 
June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 
111. Further, after the 1957 and 1974 
changes in the interpretation of the Glass-
Steagall Act, the SEC did not rush in to 
regulate banks. 
The SEC's next argument was based on 
the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. 
Variable Annuity L1je Ins. Co. of America, 
359 U.S. 65 (1965) (VAL/C), which up-
held the SEC's regulation of a particular 
type of annuity contract although insur-
ance contracts were clearly excepted from 
regulation in the Investment Act of 1940. 
Since a variable rate annuity contract dif-
fered from a traditional insurance contract 
in that annuitants under the former were 
paid a return based on the insurance com-
pany's investment of the premium, it was 
considered to be an equity share. Further, 
the laws excepted from SEC regulation a 
company engaged primarily in the tradi-
tional business of insurance. A company 
selling only the variable rate annuity con-
tract could not meet such a requirement. 
The SEC argued that a bank selling securi-
ties was in essence comparable to the de-
fendant in VALIC, and thus could not be 
defined as merely a bank. Therefore, the 
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SEC should have jurisdiction to regulate 
an institution that sells securities. How-
ever, the court pointed out that banks of 
the ABA, even if dealing in securities, still 
qualified as banks as defined in 15 U .S.C. 
§ 78c (a)(6). The court also noted that the 
ruling in V ALIC was due to the finding of 
impercise terms in the applicable statutes. 
It could not so find in this case where the 
statutory definitions were clear and un-
ambiguous. 
Rather than V ALIC, the court stated that 
the instant case was controlled by the de-
cision in Board of Governors v. Dimension 
Fin. Corp., __ U.S. __ (1986), where 
the Supreme Court struck down the Board 
of Governors' attempt to regulate as banks 
certain institutions offering negotiable 
order of withdraw (NOW) accounts. In so 
doing, the Court reiterated the fact that 
only institutions so regulated according to 
Congress' definition could be considered 
as banks. Merely offering services which 
are the functional equivalent of those of-
fered by a regulated bank could not bring 
such a financial institution under the 
powers of the bank regulators. While a 
definition relying on the identity of the 
regulator rather than, as the SEC con-
tended, the nature of the services offered 
may be imperfect, the Court noted that 
only Congress had the power to change the 
statutory definitions. 
The court further rejected the SEC's at-
tempt to show that precatory language in 
the definitions of the statutes allowed the 
court to defer to the agencies interpre-
tation of those definitions. The SEC in-
terpreted the phrase "unless the context 
otherwise requires" as referring to terms 
not included in the 1934 Act. The court, 
however, pointed to the legislative history 
which indicated that the precatory phrase 
was only intended to apply to any incon-
sistencies within the 1934 Act itself and 
did not confer such power on the SEC. 
Further, the SEC's power under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(b), to define terms of the trade and 
technical words could not give rise to a def-
inition coined by the SEC that would have 
given it additional power over an area 
previously excluded from its jurisdiction. 
With the court's ruling in this case, the 
division in the regulatory responsibility 
over commercial and investment banking 
has been clearly delineated. The SEC's at-
tempt at manipulating statutory semantics 
was summarily rejected. Unless and until 
Congress changes the definitions ofbanks, 
brokers and dealers in the Securities and 
Exchange Act or until such changes are ef-
fectuated, the SEC will not be able to regu-
late the transactions of banks as brokers or 
dealers in the securities market. 
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